Section 487 of the Judiciary Law permits the imposition of punitive damages when the actions complained demonstrate the attorney committed a deceit either upon the Court, or any party, in a pending action.
Generally conduct which is deceitful is criminal in nature - hence punitive damages are awarded separate from compensatory damages.
Punitive damages are awarded as part of the purpose of penal law which is to penalize. Civil law damages are intended to be compensatory for the loss suffered without inquiry necessarily into the intent which caused the damages.
Judiciary Law § 487 "descends from the first Statute of Westminster, which was adopted by the Parliament summoned by King Edward I of England in 1275." (See Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 8, 12 [2009].) The statute reads in its entirety:
§ 487. Misconduct by Attorneys
An attorney or counselor who:
1. Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party; or,
2. Wilfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; or, wilfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out, or becomes answerable for,
Is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law, he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.
"A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 (1) may be established either by the defendant's alleged deceit or by an alleged chronic, extreme pattern of legal delinquency by the defendant'."
(Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 975 [2d Dept 2009] and the opinion by the Court of Appeals discussed the origin of this rule of law in New York.as being traced to "the first Statute of Westminster...in 1275" and the Court found that " a cause of action for attorney deceit ...exists asa prat of New York 's common law before the first New York statute governing attorney deceit was enacted in 1787" and as such are subject to a six year statute of limitations and not a three year statute.
This decision did not delve into the interpretation of the statute but rather the application in terms of determining the timeliness of enforcement.
In the case before the Court of Appeals it was noted that initially the motion court had denied the defendant attorney motion to dismiss the claims as Defendants claimed the action was time barred because the action had not been filed within three years of the claimed event.
On appeal the intermediate appellate court reversed that order and granted the defendant's Morton and dismissed the complaint finding that the action was time barred as it was not filed within three years of the claimed event, but on appeal to the Court of Appeals the complaint was restored - the order of the Appellate Court reversed, and the matter remanded to the motion court to proceed because the application of the statute was determined to be governed by a six year statute.
The decision made no comment on the sufficiency of the claims of either party, at this stage of the matter, because the order of the Court of Appeals applies to the procedural aspect of the case and nothing further.
The net effect is that the case is returned to the motion court for the parties to continue with discovery and such other and further remedies as may be then available to each party, but the order is significant because it clarified the time limitations within which such claims may be filed. `
The seemingly disposal of this case now is revived and so to speak, rises again to begin anew, but in the wake of that journey this case has left a "trail mark" decision on this issue for others to be guided accordingly.
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